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Abstract
Empirical studies ﬁnd substantial diﬀerences in demand elasticities and associated markups among
products of diﬀerent quality. This paper analyzes the theoretical determinants of such variation. We
present a simple model that allows for horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation and accounts for endoge-
nous entry. We ﬁnd that most economic forces in our model, such as consumers’ price sensitivity, the
scope for product diﬀerentiation, and sunk costs of entry, are likely to induce lower equilibrium demand
elasticities for higher quality products. In contrast, other economic forces, such as marginal cost of
production and the distribution (across consumers) of the willingness to pay for quality, may induce
the opposite pattern. These results provide an organizing framework through which empirical ﬁndings
may be interpreted, and may also help to predict variation in demand elasticities for markets in which
empirical estimates of elasticities are unavailable or infeasible to obtain.
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The importance that price elasticities of demand play in economics would be hard to overemphasize. The
relationship among various economic variables in diﬀerent ﬁelds of economics, as well as policymaking in
these areas, is primarily driven by the magnitude of these elasticities. For example, price elasticities are
a key determinant of the impact of trade restrictions on trade volumes, the extent of exchange-rate pass-
through into export prices, the incidence of a tax increase or a merger, or the eﬀect of wage diﬀerentials
on labor demand.
Empirical studies estimating demand systems for oligopolistic industries (Bresnahan, 1987; Hausman,
Leonard, and Zona, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Goldberg, 1995; Nevo, 2001; and Petrin, 2002)
ﬁnd substantial variation in estimated price elasticities of demand and associated markups across products.
These studies attribute this variation to two key factors. First, consumers self-select into diﬀerent quality
s e g m e n t sw i t h i nam a r k e ta c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rp r i c es e n s i tivity. In particular, higher income consumers, who
are less sensitive to price, are more likely to purchase high quality products. Therefore, price elasticities
for high quality products are likely to be lower. Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), for example, use this
argument to explain why own-price elasticities for popular-priced beers are somewhat higher than those
of premium beers. Second, diﬀerent segments of the market may vary in market structure and density of
products. In particular, products in more densely populated segments face more competition, and therefore
higher own-price demand elasticities. Goldberg (1995), for example, ﬁnds low price elasticities for sports
cars and luxury cars, higher for small (subcompact) cars, and highest for intermediate size cars. She argues
that this pattern is driven by “the large number of models included in the intermediate and standard
segments.” Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) ﬁnd a similar pattern in the automobile market, and use a
similar argument to explain it.
These two explanations, price sensitivity and density of products, are not independent of one another.
If consumers of premium beers are less price sensitive, markups and proﬁts of premium beer manufacturers
will tend to be higher. Higher proﬁts will induce entry and crowding of the product space in this segment,
which will increase price elasticities. Similarly, highly dense segments in the automobile market might
be such because of entry, which was induced by lower price sensitivity of consumers and higher markups.
Therefore, an explanation of the observed diﬀerences in demand elasticities across quality segments based
on one of these factors alone is not fully satisfactory. Furthermore, other forces might also inﬂuence
demand elasticities, not only directly but also indirectly, through their eﬀect on entry incentives. For
example, high quality products tend to have more attributes along which they can be diﬀerentiated from
other products. While more diﬀerentiation induces weaker competition and lower demand elasticities, the
resulting higher markups provide incentives to enter, thus creating an opposing force. More generally,
since demand elasticities are not a primitive but are endogenously determined in a market equilibrium,
understanding how they vary across quality segments requires a framework that takes into account the
relevant forces that determine the equilibrium, and in particular the endogenous determination of the
number of competing products and the sorting of consumers. The goal of this paper is to provide such a
framework.
We develop a stylized theoretical model of industry equilibrium that predicts variation in equilibrium
demand elasticities across quality segments as a function of market primitives, such as price sensitivity of
consumers, scope for product diﬀerentiation, and marginal costs of production. While including most of
the relevant ingredients of markets with horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation, the model is still suﬃciently
simple to deliver closed-form solutions for the equilibrium values of demand elasticities and markups. As
1such, it is appealing for organizing the various conceptual determinants of equilibrium demand elasticity
diﬀerences across quality segments in a single framework.
Given the widespread relevance of demand elasticities in economics, the analysis of their theoretical
determinants is not only relevant for understanding observed regularities, but also for predicting diﬀerences
in elasticities across quality segments when empirical estimates of demand elasticities are not available,
which is often the case. Furthermore, since quality varies systematically with characteristics of products,
markets, or countries, theoretical results obtained from such analysis could also be powerful prediction tools
even when direct information on quality is unavailable. For example, since rich countries tend to produce
higher quality goods than poor countries, a negative relationship between quality and demand elasticities
would imply a larger impact of a tariﬀ on a country’s exports if the country is poor rather than rich. This
is so because the demand for the lower quality products of poor countries would be more sensitive to an
increase in import price.
Our modeling framework of a two-dimensional product space, with both a vertical and a horizontal
dimension, is similar to the frameworks used by Neven and Thisse (1990), Andersen, de Palma, and Thisse
(1992, chapters 7.5 and 8.3.3), Economides (1993), and Brekke, Nuscheler, and Rune Straume (2006). All
these papers, however, obtain equilibria with diﬀerentiation along only one (the horizontal) dimension.
This property makes it diﬃcult to address variation in equilibrium elasticities across vertical segments,
which is the main focus of our paper.
Other papers study the provision of quality by multi-product ﬁrms and occasionally obtain results on
the relationship between quality and markups. For example, the seminal work of Mussa and Rosen (1978)
ﬁnds that the percentage markup charged by a multi-product monopolist decreases with quality, while
Katz (1984), in a particular case with constant marginal costs, ﬁnds instead that markups increase with
quality. More recent studies are speciﬁcally interested in understanding the theoretical determinants of the
relationship between quality and markups. For example, Verboven (1999) proposes a duopoly model with
imperfect information and asymmetric advertisement, and ﬁnds that percentage markups increase with
quality. Canoy and Peitz (1997) develop a model that allows for limited entry (up to three ﬁrms), ﬁnding
that absolute markups increase with quality.
In contrast to this multi-product quality-provision literature, we take the spotlight away from the
interaction between vertically diﬀerentiated segments of a market, and instead place it on the role of entry,
which we allow to respond freely to economic incentives and to be targeted to speciﬁc segments of the
market where these incentives are present. While extremely stylized, our model is able to encompass the
combined eﬀect of most relevant forces that determine diﬀerences in equilibrium demand elasticities across
quality segments of a product market. Its simplicity provides signiﬁcant beneﬁts in terms of tractability and
transparency. The results are largely consistent with the common wisdom that higher quality goods have
lower demand elasticities in equilibrium, but also point to cases where this might not be true. Economic
forces such as higher sunk costs of entry and wider scope for product diﬀerentiation for higher quality goods,
as well as lower price sensitivity of consumers who buy those goods, imply that high quality products are
likely to face lower elasticities in equilibrium. In contrast, suﬃciently higher marginal costs of production
of high quality products and a large fraction of consumers willing to pay for such products may reverse
this pattern.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we characterize
the equilibrium and derive most of the results discussed above. In Section 4, which is more technical in
nature, we derive the conditions under which the equilibrium characterization of Section 3 holds. Section
5c o n c l u d e s .
22 The model
Firms’ decisions We consider a diﬀerentiated product market with both vertical and horizontal diﬀer-
entiation. The vertical component is characterized by the existence of two quality levels, each of which
deﬁnes a “quality segment” of the market.1 We denote the high quality level by δh and the low quality
level by δl,w i t hδh >δ l. Within each segment, all products are of the same quality, but are horizontally
diﬀerentiated. We use Salop’s circular city framework (Salop, 1979) to model horizontal diﬀerentiation.
The product space consists of two circles, one for high quality products and one for low quality products.
We denote the circumferences of the circles for the two quality levels by ωh and ωl, respectively. The
circumferences are allowed to be diﬀerent across product categories. For example, high quality products
m a yh a v em o r es c o p ef o rp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation, in which case ωh >ω l.2
Within this framework, the supply side of the model is fairly standard. All ﬁrms in the model are
single-product ﬁrms and are ex-ante symmetric. Firms compete in two stages. First, they decide whether
to enter the high quality segment, the low quality segment, or not to enter the market. By entering the
market, ﬁrms incur sunk costs of Fh and Fl, depending on which quality segment they enter. Once entry
decisions have taken place, all ﬁrms within a segment are symmetrically (i.e. equidistantly) located along
the circle, and compete in prices. Marginal costs of production may vary by quality segment, and are
denoted by ch and cl.
Consumers’ demand Consumers are of two types, high income and low income. High income consumers
are assumed to have a lower sensitivity to price than low income consumers, vh <v l.3 There is an exogenous
number of consumers of each income level, Sh and Sl,w h oa r ef r e et oc h o o s ef r o mw h i c hq u a l i t ys e g m e n t
to buy. The utility of consumer i with income level z ∈ {h,l} from purchasing product j of quality segment
q ∈ {h,l} is given by
uij = δq − vzpj −
¯ ¯rj − r∗
i,q
¯ ¯ (1)
where pj is the price of product j,a n d|rj −r∗
i,q| is the distance between the location of product j, rj,a n d
the location of consumer i’s ideal variety in quality circle q, r∗
i,q.
The consideration of a product market with two segments (circles), as opposed to the standard circular
city model, introduces the need to specify substitution patterns between products of diﬀerent quality. In
general, these patterns might be very rich but cumbersome to handle (see, for example, Ansari, Economides,
and Steckel (1998) and the references therein). Therefore, we make assumptions that simplify substitution
between products in diﬀerent segments. First, we assume that consumers, as they enter the market,
know the values of the quality levels, δh and δl, the number of equidistantly located ﬁr m si ne a c hc i r c l e ,
and the prices that they charge, but they do not know ex-ante the location of their ideal variety. They
need to spend market research costs, R, to learn this location, drawn from a uniform distribution along
the circle. Moreover, since products in diﬀerent segments are diﬀerentiated along diﬀerent attributes,
consumers only learn their location in one segment. To learn their location in the other segment, they have
1As will become clear, this is essentially a vertical model, in which non-adjacent quality segments do not directly compete
with each other. Therefore, it should be easy to extend the analysis to N>2 quality segments. All the results of Section 3
would remain unchanged. The equilibrium conditions of Section 4 would be more complicated, as we would need to consider
two (rather than one) adjacent quality segments.
2As an example, consider simple (low quality) t-shirts, which can only be diﬀerent in their colors, vis-a-vis higher quality
shirts, which can also be diﬀerent in the shape of their buttons.
3Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005) derive a lower price sensitivity of high income consumers from their higher sensitivity to
distance (to the ideal variety).
3to incur an additional cost of R. For simplicity, we assume that consumer i’s locations in both segments
are independent of one another, so that learning i’s location in, for example, the low quality segment is
not informative about i’s location in the high quality segment.4 These assumptions drastically simplify
substitution patterns. Conditional on R n o tb e i n gt o ol o w( s ot h a ti ti sn o ts p e n tt w i c e )o rt o oh i g h( s o
that it is spent at least once), a (risk neutral) consumer faces a nested decision. First, she chooses which
quality segment to consider by taking the expected utility over her possible realized locations. Then, she
learns her location and makes a product choice within the segment. Thus, consumers in our model have
an indirect taste for variety, as higher variety increases the expected value of their closest match. In this
sense, one can think of this approach as a discrete-choice version of a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function.
This simpliﬁed preference structure is tractable. In particular, the existence of a market research cost
solves a fundamental problem: with two (or more) quality circles and endogenous entry, there is no obvious
idea of “symmetry” that can be applied to the location of ﬁrms in such a product space.5 This problem is
solved once consumers are required to pay R to learn the location — independent across circles — of their
ideal variety. Firms in one quality segment then compete “symmetrically” with all ﬁrms located in the
other segment. The basic intuition and results should carry through to other cases, as long as substitution
across segments is limited. In particular, the case we consider here can be thought of as a limiting case
of a decreasing correlation between consumer i’s location in the two quality segments. Our results will
extend (with tighter restrictions on the parameters) as long as the correlation between these two locations
is suﬃciently small.6
3 Symmetric separating equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all entrants in a quality segment locate equidistantly from
each other and charge the same price. In addition, we search for an equilibrium that is separating, such
that high income consumers buy the high quality good and low income consumers buy the low quality good.
Finally, we assume that all consumers are served in equilibrium. In the next section we derive parameter
restrictions that make all these assumptions hold, and verify that such parameters exist.
Consider the proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm j, which produces a product of quality q. Conditional
on the rest of the ﬁrms in quality segment q charging (symmetric) price pq and serving (in a separating
equilibrium) only consumers of the corresponding income level, the residual demand for ﬁrm j is locally








4While the assumption of independence is, of course, a simpliﬁcation, one can imagine many markets in which it is a
reasonable approximation. For example, many consumer products are diﬀerentiated by their color and size at the low-end of
the product space, while at the high-end color and size can be customized, and diﬀerentiation takes place over various other
features. Similar examples can arise in the service sector. Consider demand for accounting services. At the low-end, e.g. for
tax preparation, location may be a primary factor. At the high-end, e.g. to prepare for an IPO, location is not a relevant
factor.
5Note that ﬁrms in one quality segment would not only have direct competitors (i.e. adjacent ﬁrms) in their own segment,
but they would also have direct competitors in the other segment. Generally, this will make the overall conﬁguration of ﬁrms’
locations asymmetric.
6Going back to the accounting services example, location could also be an attribute that is taken into account at the
high-end. However, as long as the choice in the high quality segment is mostly driven by preferences over other attributes,
our qualitative results should hold.
4where pq,j is the price charged by ﬁrm j and nq is the number of ﬁrms in quality segment q.T h i s l o c a l
demand function is the relevant function for the analysis of this section, which focuses on the intensive
pricing margin. In the next section we consider pricing deviations at the extensive margin, for which we
need to consider the demand function for prices further away from the equilibrium price pq.F o r s u c h
deviations, the demand is a discontinuous step function; charging suﬃciently low prices, a ﬁrm can steal all
customers from either adjacent ﬁrms or from ﬁrms producing in the other quality segment, or both. This
part of the analysis is deferred to the next section, which also derives parameter restrictions that make the
local optimum found in this section a global optimum.
Proﬁts for ﬁrm j in quality segment q are (locally) given by
πq(pq,j)=( pq,j − cq)Dq(pq,j) − Fq (3)




















In a symmetric equilibrium, pq,j = pq. Solving for the equilibrium price, we obtain
















Common wisdom about the eﬀects of v and ω on equilibrium prices and demand elasticities is supported by
equations (5) and (6). Lower price sensitivity of consumers who buy in the high quality segment (vh <v l)
induces a higher markup and a lower demand elasticity in that segment, as does a larger scope for product
diﬀerentiation (ωh >ω l). In contrast, higher quality products tend to have higher marginal costs (ch >c l),
which increases the demand elasticity for products in this segment. The last eﬀect is driven by the fact that
markups in this example (as well as in other examples described below) are determined by competition,
and are independent of the level of marginal costs. Thus, since elasticity is a percentage measure and prices
increase linearly with marginal costs, the elasticity also increases.8
Even with available information on the actual values of v, ω,a n dc, we would not be able to predict
diﬀerences in demand elasticities across quality segments without information on the number of entrants.
This can be clearly seen in equation (6), where the pattern of demand elasticities can be reversed by
conditioning on diﬀerent values of n. However, we expect long-run forces to limit the scope of relevant
variation in the number of entrants, even when this number might not correspond to a long-run equilibrium
at a particular point in time. We focus here on equilibrium elasticities (across quality segments) in a long-
run equilibrium. Therefore, the comparison of our theoretical predictions with empirical estimates of
demand elasticities — which typically take the observed number of entrants as given — is appropriate to the
extent that the number of entrants is suﬃciently close to long-run equilibrium values.9
7Note that q,i n s t e a do fz,i su s e di nvq to denote income class. As q also indexes quality segments, this is a slight abuse
of notation. However, no confusion should arise since, in the separating equilibrium we consider, there is perfect sorting of
consumers so that income and product class perfectly match.
8For the same reason, semi-elasticities and absolute (rather than percentage) markups are not aﬀected by the level of
prices, and are therefore invariant to marginal costs.
9Both in this model and in empirical studies, demand elasticities are calculated or estimated under the assumption that
ﬁrms take the number of entrants as given. A referee suggested that we call these “short-run elasticities.” Following this
suggestion, they might be thought of as short-run elasticities evaluated at a long-run equilibrium.
5In a long-run equilibrium with free entry, proﬁts are zero. Thus, for ﬁrms in quality segment q:





− Fq =0 (7)













Comparing equations (6) and (9), we can see that entry attenuates, but does not reverse, the eﬀect that
diﬀerences in v and ω impinge on equilibrium elasticities. The equilibrium elasticity still increases with
price sensitivity and decreases with the width of the product space. It also increases with marginal costs.
Equation (9) shows that, in a long-run equilibrium, demand elasticities also depend on the magnitude of
sunk costs of entry and on market size, which thus become additional factors to take into account for the
prediction of demand elasticity diﬀerences across quality segments. Sunk costs of entry (F) have a negative
eﬀect on equilibrium elasticities, as higher costs imply less entry and a more sparsely populated product
space. Segment size (S) has a positive eﬀect on equilibrium demand elasticities, as larger segments attract
more ﬁrms.
These results, although derived from a very stylized model, constitute an organizing framework that
allows us to predict systematic diﬀerences in equilibrium demand elasticities across quality segments. Con-
sistent with what the empirical literature tends to ﬁnd in many markets, most of the factors that aﬀect
demand elasticities are likely to induce lower demand elasticities and higher percentage markups for higher
quality segments. First, we typically expect consumers who buy high quality to be less sensitive to price
(vh <v l), which is true in the separating equilibrium of this model. Second, we expect the scope for
product diﬀerentiation to be greater for high quality products (ωh >ω l), as they typically possess more
attributes along which they can diﬀerentiate themselves from competing products. Third, we also expect
higher sunk costs for higher quality products (Fh >F l), as they often require higher R&D and advertising
expenditures.
This prediction, however, need not always be true. A ﬁrst oﬀsetting force arises from the fact that higher
quality goods tend to have higher marginal costs (ch >c l). Considering the opposite eﬀects of marginal
costs and sunk (or ﬁxed) costs, the relationship between the two is important for predicting variation in
elasticities across quality segments. In industries where high quality products require signiﬁcantly larger
sunk cost outlays relative to variable cost outlays, as might be the case for software or pharmaceuticals, we
are more likely to ﬁnd lower demand elasticities at the higher end of the quality spectrum. In contrast, in
markets where the high quality nature of a product is primarily driven by the use of better intermediate
materials in production or from other expenditure on variables cost as, for example, in the furniture
industry, the prediction that high quality goods face lower demand elasticities and charge higher percentage
markups might be overturned.10 A second opposing force may arise from the segment size. Even though
we typically associate a smaller segment size with higher quality, in many markets low quality is a small
niche. In those cases, demand elasticities may be lower in those lower quality segments. This is consistent
10This is not the case for absolute markups, as marginal costs do not aﬀect demand semi-elasticities.
6with empirical ﬁndings for the automobile industry, where intermediate quality cars constitute the largest
segment of the market, and have higher demand elasticities than low quality ones (Goldberg, 1995).
Because a separating equilibrium is not always sustainable, the next section characterizes parameter
restrictions that must be imposed for such an equilibrium to exist. Conditional on those parameter restric-
tions, the optimal behavior of ﬁr m sd o e sn o td e p e n do nt h ee x i s t e n c eof potential consumers who buy from
ad i ﬀerent quality segment. Thus, the results of this section are equivalent to the results that would obtain
if we assumed that quality segments were “isolated,” an alternative environment in which low (high) income
consumers would be “forced” to consume low (high) quality goods. This equivalence reﬂects our strong
assumption on substitution patterns. As discussed earlier, however, similar results would be obtained if we
allowed for limited substitution across quality segments.
Table 1 below provides results for two additional examples of alternative demand systems, comparing
them to the circular city model presented above. For these alternative cases, we do not characterize the
conditions for a separating equilibrium, as they cannot be expressed in closed form. However, similar
qualitative parameter restrictions to those derived for our baseline case in the next section would be
required. The ﬁrst example is of a circular city with quadratic transportation costs, while the second
example is of a logit demand model. For the logit model, we assume that all products in quality segment
q have mean utility of δq, so the utility of consumer i with income level z from purchasing product j is
given by uij = δq −vzpj +εij,w h e r eεij is an i.i.d draw from an extreme value distribution with dispersion
parameter ωq (which is analogous to the same parameter in the circular city model). In these alternative
models, the same qualitative results are obtained. It is interesting to note, however, that the impact of
(endogenous) entry has considerable variation across models. In particular, since the product space is never
exhausted in the logit model, entry increases at a faster rate with segment size, but has a smaller impact
on the equilibrium elasticity. As emphasized and discussed by Andersen, de Palma, and Thisse (1992,
chapter 6.4), these diﬀerences are also driven by the localized competition nature of the circular city model
compared to the non-localized competition nature of the logit model.
Table 1: Key expressions from three models of product diﬀerentiation (subscript q is omitted in all cases)
Circular (linear) Circular (quadratic) Logit
D(pj,p −j = p) 1
n − v



































































4 Conditions for equilibrium
In this section we characterize the conditions required to guarantee the existence of a symmetric separating
equilibrium and the parameter restrictions that these conditions imply. In the end of the section we discuss
these restrictions and their implications for the results.
7Consumers’ constraints
There are four types of consumer constraints that need to be satisﬁed in equilibrium: ex-ante and interim
participation constraints, and ex-ante and interim incentive constraints. The participation constraints
guarantee that every consumer buys a product (satisfying our assumption that the market is fully covered).
The incentive constraints guarantee that the equilibrium is separating. Each constraint has to hold for
both types of consumers. The ex-ante participation constraint requires that consumers prefer to invest the
market research cost R to not investing them. The ex-ante incentive constraint requires that consumers
prefer to invest the market research costs in the “correct” quality segment. Once initial market research
costs have been invested, consumers learn the realization of their ideal variety. At this point, they also
need to satisfy the two interim constraints. The interim participation constraint requires that, given their
ideal variety, consumers prefer to purchase from the nearest ﬁrm to not purchasing at all. The interim
incentive constraint requires that they are better oﬀ purchasing from the nearest ﬁrm than reinvesting
market research cost in the other quality segment.
Ex-ante constraints Let Eu∗
q|z denote the equilibrium expected utility of a consumer of income class
z from entering quality segment q. Normalizing the outside option to zero, the participation constraint
requires that11
Eu∗
q|q = δq − vqpq − E[tq] − R ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ {l,h} (10)
where E[tq] is the expected transportation cost in segment q before knowing the location of the ideal variety
(relative to the location of the ﬁrms). Since consumers’ locations are drawn from a uniform distribution
and ﬁrms are equidistantly located, expected transportation costs are E[tq]=
ωq
4nq.
Similarly, the incentive constraints require that
Eu∗




l|l = δl − vlpl − E[tl] − R ≥ δh − vlph − E[th] − R = Eu∗
h|l (12)
Interim constraints It is suﬃcient to restrict attention to interim constraints for consumers with the
worst location realization, namely those consumers whose ideal variety is just in the middle point between
two adjacent ﬁrms. For such consumers in segment q, transportation costs are
ωq
2nq. Thus, the interim
participation constraints are given by
δq − vqpq −
ωq
2nq
≥ 0 ∀q ∈ {l,h} (13)
Interim incentive constraints require that consumers do not prefer to reinvest market research cost R
in the other quality segment. This implies that
δh − vhph −
ωh
2nh
≥ δl − vhpl − E[tl] − R = Eu∗
l|h (14)
and
δl − vlpl −
ωl
2nl
≥ δh − vlph − E[th] − R = Eu∗
h|l (15)
11Again, we abuse notation by also using q to index income class.
8Summary of consumers’ constraints The above eight constraints do not impose independent restric-
tions, as the two participation constraints for high income consumers are redundant. In particular, it is
easy to check that the ex-ante (interim) participation constraint for high income consumers is satisﬁed if
the ex-ante (interim) incentive constraint is satisﬁed for these consumers and the ex-ante (interim) partic-
ipation constraint is satisﬁed for low income consumers. The remaining six constraints can be collapsed
into the following three inequalities:









































To summarize, given R, quality levels should be suﬃciently high to justify the spending of market
research and transportation cost. In addition, the diﬀerence in quality levels has to be large enough to
attract high income consumers, but not too large so that low income consumers remain attracted to low
quality products. The characterization above may seem incomplete, as some of the parameters — prices
and the number of ﬁrms — are not primitives. One should note, however, that prices and the number of
ﬁrms are given as a function of primitives in equations (5) and (8). Since each of these equations have a
separate free parameter — marginal cost in the pricing equation, ﬁxed cost and market size in the entry
equation — the existence of a set of primitives that satisfy the consumers’ constraints is still guaranteed.
We return to this in the end of this section.
Firms’ constraints
In Section 3 we solved for equilibrium prices assuming that the ﬁrst order conditions of the proﬁtm a x i -
mization problem were suﬃcient. The proﬁt function in this model, however, is not continuous, requiring
us to make additional parametric restrictions to guarantee the suﬃciency of the ﬁrst order conditions. In
particular, the discontinuities of the proﬁt function are for prices below the equilibrium price. Therefore,
we need to guard against proﬁtable deviations downwards.
There are two sources of discontinuity. First, as is well known for linear/circular city models with linear
transportation costs, once ﬁrm j sets its price suﬃciently low to attract consumers located at the exact
location of some other ﬁrm, ﬁrm k,a l lt h er e s to fﬁrm k’s customers will discontinuously prefer to buy from
ﬁrm j. The second source of discontinuity in the proﬁt function is the possibility of “ex-ante” business
stealing across quality levels. This source of discontinuity is less standard, and is driven by our assumption
of discrete consumer types. When consumers decide in which quality circle to invest R, they only take into
account the average price (or price index) in that circle, as they do not yet know the location of their ideal
variety. If ﬁrm j drops its price, the average price in the segment only changes in the order of 1/n,c r e a t i n g
a public good problem that drastically reduces the ﬁrm’s incentives to attempt such a deviation. If ﬁrm j
is the only one to decrease its price, it needs to drop it substantially to create an impact, while all other
ﬁrms in the segment enjoy the eﬀect of this action almost just as much. Still, it is possible for ﬁrm j to
set its price suﬃciently low to induce quality switching. Since all consumers in the other quality segment
have the same willingness to pay for quality, the price that induces quality switching for one consumer also
induces quality switching for all consumers of the same type. However, ﬁrm j only gains some fraction of
them, the size of which depends on how low it sets its price. The lower it is, the more of those consumers
will prefer to buy from ﬁrm j.
9Consider ﬁrst the incentive for ﬁrm j to steal all business from an adjacent ﬁr m .T od os o ,ﬁrm j would
have to compensate consumers located exactly at the neighbor’s location by at least their transportation
cost. Those consumers would then buy from ﬁrm j if and only if vqpj +
ωq
nq ≤ vqpq, i.e. pj ≤ pq −
ωq
vqnq.
But, by equation (5), this price cut is at least as large as the equilibrium markup, implying that such a
deviation cannot generate positive proﬁts, and therefore cannot be proﬁtable. As stealing customers from
other ﬁrms, which are further away, requires an even larger price cut, such deviations are not proﬁtable
either.
Thus, we only need to worry about proﬁtable deviations that induce quality switching.12 There are two
cases to consider. In the ﬁrst case, consumers who are induced to switch quality segments buy from all
ﬁrms in the segment, although disproportionately from ﬁrm j, which charges a lower price. In the second
case, the drop in the price of ﬁrm j is suﬃciently low to prevent switching consumers from buying from
adjacent ﬁrms. We consider each case in turn.
Consider the ﬁrst case, and suppose that ﬁrm j produces high quality. Consider the case in which ﬁrm
j’s price is pj while prices of all other high quality ﬁrms are ph. After some algebra, we can write the
expected utility for low income consumers who contemplate switching to the high quality segment as



















(ph − pj)2 (19)
Intuitively, the high quality segment is now more attractive, as one of its ﬁrms charges a lower price. The
ﬁrst additional element is the direct price eﬀect: with no substitution, with probability 1/nh the price will
be lower by (ph −pj). The second element captures the substitution eﬀect, as some of the consumers who
are closer to neighboring ﬁrms will now buy from ﬁrm j.
In addition to ex-ante business stealing, ﬁrm j could also steal “interim” consumers from the other
quality segment. In this case, the price is not suﬃciently low to induce ex-ante quality switching, but it is
suﬃciently low to induce quality switching by consumers with bad location realizations.13 The expected
utility of entering the high quality segment for a low income interim consumer considering switching is also
described by equation (19).
We can now derive a suﬃcient condition that rules out this kind of deviations. All we require is that
even setting price equal to marginal cost, pj = ch, will not induce either ex-ante or interim quality switching
by low income consumers.14 Comparing the expected utility of switching quality (see equation (19)) with
12To the extent that, at least in the short-run, consumers may be less informed about product-speciﬁcp r i c e si nt h e“ o t h e r ”
quality segment, inducing quality switching would be even more diﬃc u l t .I ns u c hc a s e s ,t h eﬁrm incentive constraints would
be easier to satisfy, and supporting the equilibrium would be easier.
13Business stealing of “interim” consumers does not imply a discontinuity, but instead a kink in the proﬁtf u n c t i o n .
14We do not present necessary conditions for two reasons. First, they are algebraically much more complicated but oﬀer
no additional insights. Second, a complete set of closed form necessary conditions cannot be derived when research costs are
below a minimum bound. If R is small enough, the interim incentive constraints may fail when a ﬁrm in the other quality
level lowers its price. The ex-ante expected utility of the consumer’s quality level is then aﬀe c t e di ns e v e r a lw a y s . F i r s t ,
consumers know that if they get a bad draw, they may pay R again and switch quality levels. Therefore, the expected utility
of entering the low quality segment also depends on the expected utility of buying high quality and on the probability of
switching to that segment, both of which depend on the magnitude of the price deviation. In addition, the failure of the
interim incentive constraint lowers the expected transportation costs conditional on getting a good draw. The interaction of
all these eﬀects makes the expected utility highly nonlinear in the price of the deviating ﬁrm, impeding a complete closed-
form characterization of the necessary conditions. If R is large enough, however, the interim incentive constraints hold for all
deviations of a ﬁrm in the other quality level as long as the ex-ante constraint also holds. In that case, it is possible to derive
10the utility that these consumers obtain in the low quality segment, we can obtain the required constraint:





















(ph − ch)2 (20)
where equation (20) combines the constraints for both the ex-ante and the interim consumers. Since
ph − ch = ωh
nhvh in equilibrium, this inequality can be simpliﬁed to
























An analogous analysis can be applied for a potential deviation of a low quality ﬁrm. In this case, the
suﬃcient condition is

























Consider now the second case. This is the case in which high quality ﬁrm j sets its price pj suﬃciently
low, not only for inducing low income consumers to switch quality, but also for preventing some of the
other ﬁrms in the high quality segment from selling to any low income consumers who switch. This case
only applies for high quality ﬁrms.15 Let 2k be the number of high quality ﬁrms who do not sell to low
income consumers.16 This is true when pj ∈ [ph − (k +1 ) ωh
nhvl,p h − k ωh
nhvl].N o t ea l s ot h a tk is bounded
from above by vl
vh.17 After some algebra, we can write the expected utility for low income consumers who
contemplate switching to the high quality segment as
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(23)
It is straightforward to check that this expression reduces to equation (19) when k =0a n dt h a ti ti s
decreasing in pj. T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tk is bounded from above by vl
vh, and since ph − pj cannot be
higher than the equilibrium markup, ωh





























Therefore, for such a price deviation not to attract low income consumers to switch (from both an ex-ante
and an interim perspective), it is suﬃcient to require that






























a set of conditions that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. These conditions are qualitatively similar to equations
(27) and (28), but they are much more contrived, without providing further insights.
15As shown earlier, stealing all low income consumers from adjacent ﬁrms is not proﬁtable for a low quality ﬁrm, so stealing
high income consumers from these ﬁrms would be even more costly (as high income consumers are less responsive to prices).
16This number is even since everything is symmetric on both sides of ﬁrm j. The number would be odd only if nh is even
and ﬁrm j is the only ﬁrm that sells to low income consumers. For simplicity, we ignore this case. All the conditions we derive
would be suﬃcient for this case by setting 2k = nh.
17To see this, note that a consumer who is located exactly k ﬁrms away would be indiﬀerent between ﬁrms j and k when
vlph = vlpj + k
ωh






11It is easy to see that this condition is stricter than the condition derived in equation (21), which then
becomes redundant. Therefore, suﬃcient conditions to prevent deviations by ﬁrms are given by equations
(22) and (25), which bound the diﬀerence in quality levels from below and from above, respectively.
Summary and discussion
The ﬁrms’ constraints (22) and (25) are very similar to the consumers’ incentive constraints (17) and (18).
This should not be surprising, as it is ultimately restrictions on consumers’ willingness to switch quality that
discourages ﬁrms from deviating. In fact, the ﬁrms’ constraints imply the consumers’ incentive constraints,
rendering the latter redundant. We can therefore combine all relevant constraints (for both consumers and
ﬁrms) to obtain a set of suﬃcient conditions for a separating equilibrium:

































































These three inequalities deﬁne the constraints on the parameters of the model that are suﬃcient to
guarantee that the solution we derived in Section 3 is indeed an equilibrium. The constraints impose that
quality levels are suﬃciently high, while the diﬀerence in quality levels is not too low or not too high.
For given parameters, it might be the case that the right hand side of equation (27) is larger than the
right hand side of equation (28), in which case both inequalities cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. The
following proposition shows that the constraints can simultaneously hold for suﬃciently large diﬀerence in
marginal costs.
Proposition 1 Let ∆c = ch − cl. There exists a threshold value ∆c∗ such that, for all ∆c>∆c∗,t h e r e
exists a range of δh − δl > 0 that satisﬁes the constraints and a separating equilibrium can be sustained.
If ∆c<∆c∗, a separating equilibrium may not exist. Moreover, the range of δh − δl > 0 that satisﬁes the
c o n s t r a i n t si si n c r e a s i n gi n∆c.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for this result is the following. First, equilibrium prices
have to be suﬃciently diﬀerent in equilibrium, so that low income consumers cannot aﬀord the prices that
high income consumers pay for the high quality good. Conditional on other parameters of the model — in
particular those that determine markups — the diﬀerence in equilibrium prices depends on the diﬀerence
in marginal costs, which thus has to be suﬃciently large. Second, the diﬀerence in quality levels also has
to be suﬃciently large, so that high income consumers ﬁnd it worth paying a higher price to acquire the
high quality good. The larger is the marginal cost diﬀerence, the larger is the diﬀerence in quality levels
that can be supported in equilibrium, as the lure of a signiﬁcantly higher quality is weighted by low income
consumers against the cost of paying a signiﬁcantly higher price.18
18It is interesting to brieﬂy consider how the model would change if consumers’ sensitivity to price were continuously
distributed instead of concentrated on only two points. Let us focus on the case in which R is suﬃciently high that no
consumer pays this cost twice. In that case, a separating equilibrium is characterized by a threshold value v∗, such that all
consumers with v<v ∗ choose high quality and all consumers with v ≥ v∗ choose low quality. Conditional on the existence of a
separating equilibrium and on the implied market size for each segment, equilibrium demand elasticities would be determined
by the same forces described in our simpler case. In the more general case, however, the distribution of v would play a key role
12This result indicates that the existence of a separating equilibrium depends on the relationship between
quality diﬀerences and marginal cost diﬀerences (and other parameters of the model such as diﬀerences in
sunk costs). An underlying technology (not modeled in this paper) is likely to determine the relationship
between quality and costs of production. It is natural to conjecture that, given this technology, ﬁrms
would have incentives to occupy diﬀerent segments of the quality spectrum when the available technology
is consistent with the conditions required for a separating equilibrium.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper presents a stylized model that allows for vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation and accounts
for endogenous entry. The results shed light on the determinants of equilibrium demand elasticities across
quality segments of a market. We show that most economic forces would typically induce lower demand
elasticities for higher quality products, a pattern that is consistent with the ﬁndings of most of the empirical
literature on demand system estimation. This prediction may be reversed, however, if marginal costs of
production of high quality products are signiﬁcantly higher, or if the low quality segment of a market
attracts only a small fraction of market participants.
The model is highly stylized, as our main goal is to provide a simple framework encompassing several
economic forces that simultaneously interact to determine equilibrium demand elasticities. The simplicity
pays oﬀ in terms of the transparency of the results, which are obtained in closed-form. These results may
provide an organizing framework to interpret empirical ﬁndings in the literature regarding the variation in
estimated demand elasticities across quality levels. They may also be used to predict this variation based
on limited information about product or market characteristics.
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Appendix: proof of Proposition 1
Given the equilibrium conditions provided by equations (26), (27), and (28) we can now substitute for the
endogenous variables. First we substitute for prices

































































14a n dt h e nf o rt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms
















































































where, as can be seen, K1 and K2 are functions of the primitives of the model, but not of marginal
costs. These three inequalities are only functions of primitives. The ﬁrst inequality would be satisﬁed for
suﬃciently high δl. The last two inequalities are satisﬁed for δh − δl ∈ [vh∆c + K1,v l∆c + K2].T h u s ,
we only need to guarantee that this interval is not empty. Since vl >v h the interval is non-empty for
suﬃciently high ∆c.I np a r t i c u l a r ,f o ra n y∆c>∆c∗ where ∆c∗ = K1−K2
vl−vh .Q . E . D
15